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Craig Burgess* 
 
Identification of a person suspected of a heinous crime before being charged risks 
prejudicing a fair trial. The identification of rogue former Queensland surgeon Dr Jayant 
Patel is but one recent example. Present laws place this type of negative publicity outside the 
reach of sub judice contempt. This article argues there should be a change in the law making 
it an offence for the media to publish the fact that a person is under investigation until the 
person has been charged. 
I INTRODUCTION 
It is possible very effectually to poison the fountain of justice before it begins to flow. 
It is not possible to do so when the stream has ceased.1
The genesis for this article arises from a number of recent criminal cases involving high 
profile people, and others, accused of heinous crimes.2 Dr Jayant Patel is the latest to suffer 
sustained negative media publicity since complaints related to his medical competency were 
first raised in 2004 and early 2005. These complaints, as well as others relating to other 
medical practitioners and Queensland Health administrators, led to the establishment of the 
Queensland Public Hospitals Commission of Inquiry. At the conclusion of its public hearing 
the Inquiry recommended Dr Patel be the subject of further investigation by the Queensland 
Police Service in relation to fraud, assault, assault occasioning bodily harm, grievous bodily 
harm, negligent acts causing harm and manslaughter.3 In November 2006 a Queensland 
magistrate signed warrants for these charges which, at the time of writing, are in the hands of 
                                                 
* BA USQ LLM(research) QUT Lecturer Media Law & Ethics, University of Southern Queensland 
1 R v Parke [1903] 2 KB 432. 
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the Federal Attorney-General’s department which will assess whether they meet extradition 
treaty requirements and should be pursued.4  Dr Patel has not returned to Australia since his 
departure in 2005 and he continues to attract considerable interest from the Australian media 
while living in Portland, Oregon. This article considers whether Dr Patel will receive a fair 
trial if he returns or is extradited to return to Australia. It will be argued that there are 
significant obstacles to ensuring the fairness of any criminal trial which Dr Patel may face. 
Prejudicial publicity in relation to Dr Patel may be such that an Australian court would find it 
impossible to ensure that Dr Patel was not tried unfairly. Similar parallels have been drawn 
from the situation involving the late, disgraced businessman Christopher Skase.5 As with 
Skase, the question is not whether Dr Patel is guilty or not – that is an issue for the court. 
Rather, the question considered here is whether or not a jury trial involving Dr Patel would 
contain the elements of a fair trial in which his guilt or innocence could be determined. A 
particular element of a fair trial that would be at risk would be the impartiality of a jury which 
would be drawn from a potentially prejudiced population. The question thus becomes 
whether the extensive pre-trial and pre-charge publicity that Dr Patel has been subjected to 
would prevent him from receiving a fair trial, and what action can be taken to alleviate that 
unfairness. 
II FREEDOM OF SPEECH 
The media often define freedom of speech as ‘the right to know’. This article acknowledges 
that right. But it also recognises there are occasions when the public’s ‘right to know’ has to 
be curtailed in the wider public interest such as the proper administration of justice. For 
example, as this article argues, prohibiting the naming of a suspect and any other prejudicial 
material before charges are laid. Most people recognise the desirability of freedom of speech. 
But how does one define it? Perhaps the shortest definition would be the expression of 
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thought through spoken word. The Australian Law Reform Commission has said there is no 
doubt that freedom of expression is one of the hallmarks of a democratic society, and has 
been recognised as such for centuries.6 Butler has succinctly described free speech as ‘speech 
that is not subjected to regulation by the State’.7 According to the celebrated English jurist 
Lord Denning it means that everyone should be free to think his own thoughts and to have his 
own opinions and to give voice to them so long as he does not speak ill of his neighbour or 
incite anyone to violence.8 A common example given for the reasons for restrictions on free 
speech is the scenario where a person shouts, without justification, ‘fire’ in a crowded theatre 
thereby causing panic and potential injury. In those circumstances most people would agree 
that the law should prohibit an action such as that. Australia, under its Constitution, does 
recognise the right to trial by jury.9 But it does not have a written Bill of Rights guaranteeing 
freedom of speech. However, Australia has ratified the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) of which Article 19 declares: 
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference. 
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include 
freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds regardless of 
frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other 
media of his choice. 
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it 
special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, 
but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary: 
(a) For respect of the rights or reputation of others; 
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(b) For the protection of national security or of public order, or of public health or 
morals. 
However, Article 19 is qualified by other rights such as the right to reputation Article (17) 
and Article (14) the right to a fair hearing before the courts which conflicts with the right to 
freedom of speech. Therefore by exercising one’s right to freedom of speech one can 
conceivably threaten another person’s to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according 
to law which goes to the heart of my argument. The problem when rights are granted in 
absolute terms, the legal process of determining how and in what circumstances they are to 
apply is carried out in a vacuum. When the ‘whole’ of a right is granted by a Bill of Rights, 
the text gives no guidance about the priorities that are to be reconciled or that govern, when 
one right conflicts with another. For example, the battle between the First Amendment10 and 
the Sixth Amendment11 of the US Bill of Rights has been waged in the courts and seemingly 
won by the First Amendment. According to at least one legal commentator that victory has 
enabled the media to exert a corrupting influence over trials and has had a pervasive and 
detrimental effect on the rights of accused persons.12 One need not look far to see several 
examples of the veracity of this assertion in the trials of people like O.J. Simpson, Michael 
Jackson, William Kennedy Smith and the Menendez brothers which were all attended with 
massive and manifestly prejudicial pre-trial publicity. Such cases lead to the conclusion that 
from a justice point of view, prevention is better than a cure. In summary, what all 
commentators acknowledge is that there is a broad range of legitimate opinion about which 
interest should prevail in the various factual circumstances that arise for decision. However, 
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the weight of judicial authority is that measures that are clearly necessary for due process of 
law should take precedence over freedom of speech. This is particularly true in relation to 
criminal trials where an individual’s liberty is at stake and where the public have an interest 
in securing the conviction of persons guilty of serious crime. The Law Commission of New 
Zealand in supporting this position made the following comment: 
When a conflict arises between a fair trial and freedom of speech, the former has prevailed because the 
compromise a fair trial for a particular accused may cause them permanent harm (for example, because 
a conviction has been entered wrongly) whereas the inhibition of media freedom ends with the 
conclusion of legal proceedings.13
This comment reinforces the argument of this article that publishing a suspect’s name before 
a charge is brought threatens a fair trial and therefore the freedom of speech principle should 
yield to the proper administration of justice.  
III A FAIR TRIAL 
Truth like all other good things, may be loved unwisely – may be pursued too keenly – may cost too 
much.14
NSW Chief Justice Spigelman J said recently restraints on the processes for determining truth 
are multi-faceted: 
They have emerged in numerous different ways, at different times and affect different areas of the 
conduct of legal proceedings. By the traditional common law method of induction there has emerged in 
Australia’s jurisprudence the principle of a fair trial. It is reflected in numerous rules and practices and 
manifests itself in virtually every aspect of legal practice and procedure, including the laws of 
evidence.15
It is interesting Spigelman refers to the ‘principle of a fair trial’ and not a right (my emphasis) 
to a fair trial. While there are other jurisdictions where a right to a fair trial is enshrined either 
in a Constitution or in a statute this is not the case in Australia. Although two former Justices 
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Bond University, Gold Coast Queensland. 
 5
of the High Court (Deane and Gaudron JJ) have concluded, albeit in obita dicta, that the right 
is constitutionally guaranteed.16 Furthermore the significance of the principle of a fair trial 
has been characterised in numerous High Court judgments in recent years as ‘the central 
thesis of the administration of criminal justice17; as ‘the central prescript of our criminal 
law’18; as a ‘fundamental element’19; and as an ‘overriding requirement’.20 This leads to the 
question of what are the attributes of a fair trial? On close examination it would be difficult to 
describe the almost infinite variety of situations where a trial has been so deprived on the 
quality of fairness that a miscarriage of justice has occurred. Of course a number of 
identifiable issues have arisen over the years and led to similar judgments as to the effect on 
the fairness of proceedings. Lord Bingham said in R v H; R v C: ‘The achievement of fairness 
in a trial on indictment rests above all on the correct and conscientious performance of their 
roles by judge, prosecuting counsel, defending counsel and jury’.21 To that he might also 
have added: ‘and the media’ because ‘trial by media’22 by its very nature detracts from the 
notions of what the law describes as a fair trial. That is a trial free from prejudice. A trial 
where jurors already have preconceived notions of the guilt or innocence of the accused can 
hardly be said to be ‘a fair and impartial trial’ as defined in The King v MacFarlane; ex parte 
O’Flanaghan and O’Kelly.23 Much of the evidence tendered by the Crown in a criminal trial 
is prejudicial to the accused in the sense that it implies guilt. Some evidence which is highly 
prejudicial however, is not disclosed to the jury. Rules of evidence have developed with 
respect to various classes of evidence governing the question whether such evidence should 
be admitted in certain circumstances or not at all, and limited the general discretion of the 
                                                 
16 Dietrich v R (1992) 177 CLR 292, 326 (Deane J), 362 (Gaudron J). 
17 McKinney v The Queen (1991) 171 CLR 468 at 478 
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19 Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292 at 299 per Mason CJ and McHugh J. 
20 Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292 at 330 per Deane J. 
21 [2004] UKHL 3 at para 13. 
22 ‘Trial by Media’ is a phrase made popular in the 20th century describing the impact of media coverage on 
judicial proceedings by creating a widespread perception of the guilt or innocence of the accused regardless of 
the jurisdiction or findings of a court of law. 
23 (1923) CLR 518 at 541-542. 
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judge in certain ways. Even where evidence is apparently admissible, the presiding judge has 
discretion to disallow it if its admission ‘would operate unfairly against the defendant’.24 
Thus the judge may exclude illegally obtained evidence which is technically admissible.25 
Evidence ought to be excluded ‘if its prejudicial tendency outweighs its probative value in the 
sense that the jury may attach undue weight to it or use for inadmissible purposes’.26 Yet 
none of these rules restrain the media when they undertake to ‘try’ accused persons before 
they have appeared in court through expositions of their ‘bad’ character. This surely would 
put at risk an accused’s likelihood of receiving a fair trial whatever remedies were put in 
place to ensure that he or she did. It may well be the so called ‘free speech cases’ which 
recognised an implied freedom of political communication in the Australian Constitution 
have encouraged the media in Australia to push the boundaries in regard to pre-trial 
prejudicial publicity. 
 In Nationwide News Pty Ltd27 and Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd28, a majority of the 
High Court of Australia had distilled from the provisions and structure of the Constitution, 
particularly from the concept of representative government which is enshrined in the 
Constitution, an implication of freedom of communication. Subsequently in Theophanous v 
Herald & Weekly Times Ltd29 and Stephens v WA Newspapers30 , a majority of the court 
extended the operation of the implied freedom doctrine into the field of defamation law. The 
operation of the common law and State statutes was modified by the creation of a new 
‘constitutional’ defence based upon the implication of freedom of political discourse. 
Ultimately in Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation31 all seven justices of the High 
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27 (1992) 177 CLR 1. 
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Court rejected the existence of any freestanding constitutional defence, but confirmed the 
availability of an expanded defence of qualified privilege in cases of political discussion. The 
Attorney General (NSW) v X 32 judgment by the NSW Court of Appeal in which the Chief 
Justice opined that the courts must, as a result of the High Court cases, now attribute greater 
weight to the freedom of public discussion when conducting a balancing test would also not 
have gone unnoticed. 
IV ANALYSIS OF PRESENT SUB JUDICE CONTEMPT LAW 
The term sub judice means ‘in course of trial’.33 It is also often referred to as being ‘under a 
judge’. The object of the law is to prohibit the publication of material that might prejudice 
civil or criminal proceedings while those proceedings are pending. The word ‘pending’ is a 
key word and will be analysed in greater detail further on. The difficulty is determining the 
exact time a matter becomes sub judice or ‘under a judge’. Because this paper concerns 
criminal proceedings, the law as it relates to civil proceedings will not be examined further. 
Publications are regarded as contemptuous because their tendency is to place at risk the due 
administration of justice concerning a particular proceeding. 
1 Elements of sub judice contempt 
To constitute sub judice contempt of court it must be established: 
(a) that publication took place while proceedings were sub judice34; and 
(b) either that: 
(i) there was an intention to interfere with the administration of justice in 
       the proceedings35; or 
(ii) The publication of the material had that tendency.36
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The principal aim of sub judice contempt is to pre publications that may damage a fair 
trial before any damage is done. It is therefore necessary to frame liability in terms of 
the likelihood of prejudice, rather than punish after prejudice has occurred in order to 
deter the media from publishing prejudicial material and encourage them to exercise 
proper care. It should not be thought contempt law is unique in its application to 
prevent an infraction of the law before it occurs. An analogy can be given of 
legislation regulating industrial safety and road safety. Employers and drivers may be 
punished for maintaining an unsafe workplace or driving unsafely even though no one 
is injured. In this way the law imposes a positive duty to prevent injury from arising 
rather than waiting for injury to occur. In this case the injury would be to the accused 
who would be deprived of his or her right to a fair trial free of prejudice. However, as 
one commentator has said, to speak of contempt as preventative would be misleading; 
it is more properly a deterrent, and it does not always prevent jury prejudice.37 Indeed 
this is the thrust of my article that the present contempt of laws do not go far enough 
in deterring the media from prejudicing potential jurors by their publication of 
prejudicial material before an accused is charged or brought before the judicial 
process. The chief aim in punishing justice as well as the individual’s right to a fair 
trial. Although some legal experts argue the chief aim is in fact public interest rather 
than the fair trial argument.38
2 When are proceedings sub judice? 
The restrictions sub judice places on publicity apply from the time when the 
procedures of the criminal law have been set in motion. This means when a person 
has been arrested or charged or if a summons or information has been issued.39 The 
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New South Wales Law reform Commission recommends the starting point for sub 
judice in that state begins with: 
(a) the arrest of the accused; 
(b) the laying of the charge; 
(c) the issue of a court attendance notice and its filing in the registry of the 
relevant court; or 
(d) the filing of an ex officio indictment.40 
The decision of the High Court in James v Robinson established that, in Australia, 
proceedings are not sub judice unless they are pending. In this case, a Perth 
newspaper known as the Sunday Times published two accounts of two killings by a 
‘wild gunman’. The articles clearly identified Robinson as the gunman and it was 
related that after killing two named persons in public places and threatening others he 
had secreted himself in a pine plantation not far from Perth. The reports appeared in 
the newspaper on Sunday 10th February 1963. It was not until Tuesday 12th February 
1963 that complaints were sworn alleging two murders by Robinson and that on the 
following day he was charged and remanded in custody. Subsequently the Supreme 
Court of Western Australia imposed penalties for contempt of court upon the 
publishers of the newspaper. The publishers then successfully appealed the decision in 
the High Court. 
The appellant’s argued there was no reported case in England or the Dominions in 
which it has been held that a statement made out of court amounted to a contempt of 
court in the absence of a pending cause. They did concede however, there was a 
Scottish case, Sterling v Associated Newspapers Ltd41 which was contrary to the 
appellants submissions. For their part the respondents argued ‘pending’ can refer to a 
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matter in which action is intended to be taken but has not commenced. The 
determination of the police to apprehend Robinson on a charge of unlawful killing 
amounted to setting the criminal law in motion. To distinguish the case where an 
arrest is ‘imminent’ from the case where an arrest has actually been made is to draw 
an artificial line. The prejudice is there because it is almost certain that proceedings 
will very soon be instituted. The decision of the High Court in James v Robinson has 
been criticised in Borrie & Lowe42 who point out that the common law decisions in 
England at the time were not committed to the idea that proceedings had to be 
‘pending’. The Australian media, in particular, argue moving the test of when material 
comes under sub judice rules from ‘pending’ to ‘imminent’ poses problems of 
certainty for them. This is a fair point. However, this article argues if a statutory ban 
on naming a suspect before they have been formally charged in court is introduced 
then the uncertainty problem would be overcome for the benefit of all concerned. 
V INJUSTICE OF A SUSPECT IDENTIFIED BUT NOT CHARGED 
It is now pertinent to identify some cases where suspects have been named before 
they have been charged.  As mentioned above Dr Jayant Patel’s case is but one 
example. In R v Long43 a suspect was not only identified in a newspaper but his 
alleged former criminal acts (some of which were invented) were also published.44 
Former Queensland Member of Parliament, Bill D’Arcy was named in the media as 
being under investigation over child sex allegations before he had been charged and 
even before police had interviewed him.45 Not surprisingly the media’s actions were 
swiftly denounced by D’Arcy’s lawyer who accused journalists of ‘trashing’ his 
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Mail,26 June, 2000 at p.5 where Long was reported to have previously been found guilty of attempted murder. 
Long’s criminal history tendered in court during sentencing submissions did not disclose any conviction for 
attempted murder. 
45 ‘MP will not quit over sex claims’, The Courier-Mail, 4 September 1998 at p.1. 
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client’s presumption of innocence.46 The media responsible for the publication 
pointed out they had not broken any law in naming the MP and were in fact advancing 
‘the interests of the public’.47  Finally, a suspect in a recent notorious Brisbane triple 
murder has been subject to prejudicial material even more damaging than that endured 
by Long and D’Arcy. To take on example, The Courier-Mail devoted six columns to 
an analysis of the suspect’s website.48 The article claimed the man (who at the time of 
writing has yet to be charged) listed ‘cars, girls and death’ on his website and they 
also revealed his personal dislikes including ‘liars and unfaithful people’. A photo of 
his website was also published.49  Also included in the article was a full record of his 
previous convictions and the details of the illegal activities he was alleged to have 
been involved in that led to his convictions plus the fact that he had served a nine-year 
sentence for arson. Should the man ever be charged it would not be difficult to 
imagine that at least one jury member drawn from the Brisbane area or anywhere in 
Queensland would have read or heard this material. Of course a suspect named by the 
news media as being under investigation does have the civil remedy of defamation 
available should the matter not go any further or, if in the event of being charged, the 
charges are later dropped. A defamation action may not however, restore the person’s 
reputation. 
1. Police/media co-operation: An unholy alliance 
Another reason for not identifying suspects before being charged is to prevent the 
insidious technique which police use in building pressure on a suspect. Police claim 
their motive is to assist any investigation by possibly alerting more potential witnesses 
to the suspect’s alleged crime to come forward. But by naming the suspect to the 
                                                 
46 Terry O’Gorman, ‘The issue of naming rights’, The Courier-Mail 5 September 1998 at p.27. 
47 Chris Mitchell, ‘Media’s reply should be aired’, The Courier-Mail, 5 September 1998 at p.27. 
48 ‘Triple murder suspect’s personal interests: Cars, girls and death’, The Courier-Mail, 10 April 2004 at p. 3. 
49 Ibid. 
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media and allowing them to detail the suspect’s alleged crime it also primes potential 
jurors with information that could help the police’s aim of securing a conviction. 
A case in point is the on-going investigations into Perth’s Claremont serial killer. The 
case involves the disappearance and murder of several young Perth women in the 
1990’s which understandably has frightened and outraged the community who in turn 
have brought great pressure on police to find and prosecute the alleged offender. The 
body of one of the missing women was found in 1996. Police told the media vital 
clues had been gained from the crime scene but the details of the clues were not 
revealed. In April 1998 police detained a man who was later revealed to be their 
‘chief’ suspect. In August 1998 ABC Television revealed the man’s name and the fact 
that he had been given and failed a lie detector test. Western Australian Director of 
Public Prosecutions, Robert Cock, was one of several judicial figures unimpressed 
with police leaking such juror-sensitive information. He said he could not imagine a 
situation in which the results of a test, which are not admissible in proceedings, could 
ever be justified.50 According to the President of the Australian Council for Civil 
Liberties, Terry O’Gorman, by using the media the police were able to escape 
responsibility for revealing information they knew they were prevented from talking 
about in the public domain.51 Since then another suspect has accused Western 
Australian police of threatening him with media exposure and relentless police 
scrutiny.52
 V1 REMEDIES FOR OVERCOMING THE EFFECTS OF PREJUDICIAL 
PUBLICITY 
                                                 
50 Radio National, Background Briefing, 25 June 2000, transcript. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Paige Taylor & Amanda Banks, ‘I’m being framed for murder: cabbie’, The Australian, 23 September 2004, 
at p. 3. 
 13
There are a number of options which courts take into account when examining 
remedies to overcome the effects of prejudicial pre-trial publicity. These include but 
are not limited to: delaying the start of a trial, changing the venue, the issuing of 
judicial instructions to ignore prejudicial publicity, discharging a jury , challenging 
juries for cause and a trial by a judge alone. This article argues that many of these 
remedies would be unnecessary if the media were prevented from naming a suspect 
before they have been charged. In addition, it is argued, some of the above remedies 
may in some circumstances cause more harm than good to the accused’s prospects of 
receiving a fair trial. For example, a new trial can increase the strain and hardship 
suffered by the accused who may be in custody. The remedies may also cause 
inconvenience and emotional upset to other parties involved, witnesses and jurors 
especially when a jury must be sequestered for part or all of the trial. Similarly, a 
change of venue causes inconvenience and expense to all those involved in the trial. It 
is also of negligible effect in cases where the crime has attracted national or 
international attention as with Christopher Skase and Dr Patel. Where a conviction 
must be quashed and a new trial ordered or, in extreme cases, permanently stayed due 
to prejudicial publicity, the public interest in the administration of justice is frustrated. 
The victim of crime is left without having his or her suffering and outrage aired and 
without seeing retribution. Nevertheless fairness to the accused and the integrity of 
the trial means these costs should be borne by the State in the interests of justice. Of 
course, each case will turn on its own facts. As has been noted by leading Western 
Australian criminal barrister, Mark Trowell QC53 there will be cases where the 
publicity has been so prejudicial that it would deprive the accused of a fair trial. In 
that circumstance a suggestion might be that judges should be inclined to be more 
                                                 
53 Mark Trowell QC, ‘The media and the criminal law’, paper presented to LAWASIA Downunder 2005, Gold 
Coast, 23 March 2005. 
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flexible and prepared to exercise their discretion in favour of an accused rather than 
placing their absolute belief that a strong direction to a jury will solve the problem. 
The argument by this article that there be a ban on the identification of a suspect 
before being charged in the interests of fairness would, if the Long and D’Arcy cases 
are any guide, reduce the number of applications made to the court to remedy the 
effects of prejudicial publicity as well as the resultant costs and other factors. 
VII ANALYSIS OF DATA 
United States research supports the hypothesis of this article that jurors exposed to 
negative pre-trial publicity are significantly more likely to judge a defendant guilty 
compared to jurors exposed to no negative pre-trial publicity.54 It is also worthy of 
note that pre-charge publicity where the media is not constrained by sub judice 
contempt is especially damaging to an accused. 
The first application in Australia of a case study methodology on the topic of 
prejudicial publicity was carried out by Chesterman, Chan and Hampton in New 
South Wales.55 The study looked at 41 selected criminal trials held in NSW between 
mid-1997 and mid-2000. Jurors, judges and the principal counsel on both sides were 
asked to participate in structured interviews conducted after the trial was concluded. 
The interviewees were asked about their impressions of how prejudicial media 
publicity associated with the trial might have affected the perceptions of the jurors 
and verdicts reached. They were also asked about a number of associated matters, 
such as what steps, if any, were taken within the trial process to prevent or mitigate 
any prejudice potentially arising from publicity. Independent research into the scale 
and nature of the media publicity associated with each trial was also carried out. The 
                                                 
54 Nancy Mehrkens Steblay, Jasmina Besirevic, Solomon M. Fulero & Belia Jimenez-Lorente, ‘The Effects of 
Pre-trial Publicity on Juror Verdicts: A Meta-Analytic Review’, Law and Human Behavior, (1999) Vo.23, No 2 
at 219. 
55 Chesterman M, Chan, J and Hampton S Managing Prejudicial Publicity: An empirical study of criminal jury 
trials in New South Wales (February 2001). 
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underlying aim was to complete a set of 41 case studies from which insights into the 
effects of prejudicial publicity on criminal trial juries might be obtained. 
The principal findings on the incidence of jury recall of pre-trial publicity were as 
follows:- 
1. Jurors chiefly recalled media reports of the commission of the alleged 
offence. They less frequently recalled reports of the arrest of the accused. 
They recalled reports of committal hearings or other pre-trial proceedings 
even less frequently. In 53 per cent of the trials in which some form of pre-
trial publicity was recalled by at least one juror, the publicity was 
discussed in the jury room.56 
2. Jurors were more likely to recall pre-trial publicity – for example, reports 
of pre-trial proceedings – in three situations. These were when: 
(a) it related to accused people who were independently well-known in 
the community; 
(b) it related to offences committed in the area where the jurors lived; 
or 
(c) they did not encounter it until after the trial began. Other familiar 
explanations for pre-trial publicity being recalled – for example, 
that it appeared unusually close to the start of the trial or was 
especially prominent – were also discernable.57  
These findings seem to suggest that of particular relevance to jury recall is the extent 
to which the case has captured public attention of which the “Dr Death” scandal is but 
one of many examples. 
 
                                                 
56 Ibid, xiv para 1. 
57 Ibid, p.xiv paras 2-3. 
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VIII PREFERRED APPROACH 
The presumption of innocence is a fundamental principle of the common law and has 
been enshrined in international covenants.58 The most significant effect of the 
presumption is its requirement that the Crown bear the burden of proving all elements 
of the charges but a logical extension of it is an accused should suffer no detriment as 
a result of being charged let alone merely suspected. There does not appear any 
reason why this principle should be disturbed for some greater public interest. The 
public interest, in this context, means more than prurient desire to know the identity of 
accused persons. Also publishing the name of an accused before they appear in court 
pre-empts their right to apply to the court for a suppression order because once the 
accused’s identity is known a subsequent suppression order would be of little benefit. 
If the media are allowed to name an accused and the details of his or her alleged crime 
there is a risk that potential jurors will be made aware of, and be influenced by, 
material that is not subsequently admitted as evidence in a trial. This conclusion is 
supported by Chesterman’s study which found jurors chiefly recalled reports of the 
commission of an alleged offence rather than reports of the arrest of the accused. 
Unfortunately, for an accused, the decision to publish a person’s name before they are 
formally charged is not in contempt of court. Therefore to close this gap it is 
recommended: 
Publication of identifying details of a person charged or suspected of an offence 
before they appear in court should be prohibited unless the person consents or it 
is necessary to ensure the safety of a person or the community and/or to help 
locate the suspect. 
                                                 
58 “The golden thread” per Sankey LC in Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462 at 481; Article 14 International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
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This recommendation closely follows Queensland’s Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) 
Act 1978 which is the only Queensland Act that contains a restriction on the 
publication of information that may identify an adult accused.59 Children under the 
age of 17 also enjoy the protection of the Juvenile Justice Act 199260 Interestingly, 
anonymity for defendants in sexual offence matters was repealed in the United 
Kingdom in 1988 following a recommendation by the Criminal Law Revision 
Committee (1984). One of the reasons was the injustice of singling out alleged sexual 
offenders for special protection ‘while other defendants, including those accused of 
the more heinous crime of murder, could be identified’.61
In Australia there is the absurd situation in most jurisdictions where a person charged 
with the murder of a child can be named whereas a person accused of a sexual crime 
cannot. This is especially true where by naming a person accused of a sexual offence 
there is a risk of identifying the complainant or complainants. This then leads to the 
question of equity. Why should a complainant enjoy protection from identification 
when an accused, especially when they have not been charged, be exposed to the full 
blast of publicity? 
Conclusion 
To end at the beginning; if the notorious Dr Jayant Patel is ever extradited to 
Queensland there will be grave doubts concerning the circumstances in which he 
could ever be tried fairly. If the media had been banned from revealing his name until 
his appearance in court (assuming this will in fact occur) there would be at least a 
                                                 
59 S10 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act (Qld) prohibits a person from making or publishing a 
statement or representation that reveals the name, address, school or place of employment of: 
(a) a complainant (defined as a person who is alleged to be the victim of any offence of a sexual nature) at 
any time; and 
(b) a defendant charged with only certain sexual offences before the defendant is committed for trial or 
sentence. 
60 Legislation in all Australian States and Territories protects the identity of a juvenile accused of a criminal 
offence. 
61 Home Office (2002) Protecting the public: Strengthening protection against sex offenders and reforming the 
law on sexual offences,p.19, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, Norwich (UK). 
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chance that the usual instructions by a judge to ignore prior prejudicial publicity 
would have some effect. That is because his name until then would not have been 
connected with the reportage of his allegedly criminal acts. It is difficult to understand 
how the public interest would not be served by a mere delaying of an accused’s name 
until he or she actually appears in court. Or to put it another way, how is the public 
interest served by publishing inadmissible material before a trial? A law banning 
publication of an accused’s name until charged would go some way to re-dressing 
what is arguably an imbalance between freedom of speech and a fair trial. 
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